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Letters to the Editor Four suggestions for addressing public concern 
regarding synthetic biology
Alex David Hatch
Abstract
The following essay was written by Mr. Alex Hatch, a junior undergraduate student majoring in Biological Engineering 
at Utah State University. Mr. Hatch submitted a 1000-1200 word essay to the 5th Annual Bioethics Contest sponsored by 
the Institute of Biological Engineering (IBE). A group of professionals in Biological Engineering assessed and ranked the 
essays in a blinded process. Five semi-finalists were invited to present their essays at a session at the annual meeting of 
IBE in Cambridge, MA on March 6, 2010. Five judges scored all the presentations and selected Mr. Hatch's contribution 
as the overall winner (first place).
Essay
The very characteristics of synthetic biology that make it
such a promising field are those that introduce concern.
Concerns in the field come from a public sphere and from
the scientific community itself [1,2]. As concerns arise,
the scientific community has the responsibility to
respond in a way that benefits the public first. Addressing
all of the concerns facing synthetic biology is beyond the
scope of this essay. This essay will focus, rather, on a dis-
cussion of the challenges associated with synthetic biot-
errorism and a proposal of four steps that can be taken in
the short term that would foster safety and trust between
the community of synthetic biologists (community) and
the public whom they serve.
Synthetic Biology, Bioweapons, and Bioterrorism
Synthetic biology is "an approach to engineering biology
[3]." It builds on the foundational principles of recombi-
nant DNA technologies and allows more efficient modifi-
cation or enhancement of cellular function [4]. Specific
applications that simplify and increase efficiency of the
modification of cellular function include but are not lim-
ited to:
• Creation of databases of units of DNA that "encode
basic biological functions" which are "freely available
to the public" [5]
• Development of interchangeable biological parts
that are easily combined
• Development and improvements in automated
DNA synthesis and whole genome synthesis [6,7]
• Relative ease of ordering DNA parts or synthesized
DNA [7]
• Potential to own oligonucleotide synthesizers that
would enable independent automated DNA synthesis
[8]
As the technology develops, participating in the science
will become increasingly efficient and available to a wide
range of people [8]. Reports have been released detailing
how scientists synthesized pathogenic viruses including
polio virus and the 1918 influenza virus [6,9-11]. These
examples show that synthetic biology is very powerful
and could potentially be manipulated in a malevolent
manner.
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention prohib-
its participant nations from using, developing, or stock-
piling biological weapons [12]. There are weaknesses in
this governing policy, but to this point in time it has pre-
vented international biological warfare. One expert
points out, however, that 9/11 demonstrates "that
humans [are] capable of unimaginable evil [13]." More-
over, and in contrast to research of the past, the founda-
tional development of synthetic bioweapons could be
performed with "little equipment and infrastructure
[14]." The intention to use bioweapons and relative ease
of implementation could be compatible with terrorist
agendas.
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Four Steps to Help Ensure Public Safety
Following are four steps that help address synthetic biot-
errorism specifically, but also address concerns regarding
synthetic biology. The four steps are:
1.) Community initiative to regulate the receipt of DNA
constructs
2.) International regulation
3.) Increased investment in research of risk assessment
and public perception
4.) Education
1.) In conjunction with the synthetic biology 2.0 and 3.0
conferences (2006, 2007), suggestions were made to
establish best practices for gene synthesis companies
[8,15]. These reports indicated that not all gene synthesis
companies performed routine screenings for potentially
pathogenic DNA orders. Conference participants pro-
posed that the community refuse to do business with
those companies that fail to implement routine safety and
security practices. A licensing/registration of individuals/
equipment needed to perform automated DNA synthesis
could take place. The community would then be allowed
to determine who was licensed and ensure that known
pathogenic constructs were controlled. Required screen-
ing and licensing of individuals and automated DNA syn-
thesis equipment would greatly reduce the ability of
terrorist groups to obtain harmful constructs and to carry
out potentially harmful research. This regulation
addresses one of the major public concerns of synthetic
biology with little change required in current practices
[16].
2.) In dealing with bioterrorism and synthetic biology in
general, regulations must exist at an international scale. A
failure to have consensus on an international level will
lead to difficulties in enforcement. The merging of cul-
tures and backgrounds to create an international policy
that meets the demands of contributing parties will be
difficult. In the matter of regulating bioterrorism, how-
ever, unity must be reached. The attempt for individual
nations to regulate will fail because the research can
move to a location that has no formal policy against
research in question [13]. In an effort to create interna-
tional policy, the wishes of all participants will never be
met, so there must be a willingness to recognize on all
sides, fundamental practices that pose a risk to the safety
and peace of society, and to act only on those most funda-
mental principles. International policy accepted in the
community of synthetic biology must exist.
3.) While addressing the National Academy of Sciences,
David Rejeski stated that approximately 30 million dollars
in U.S. federal funding went toward synthetic biology
each year [17]. Of the 30 million dollars, he claimed that
none was specifically devoted to public engagement or
risk assessment. In studies he has overseen, the repeated
wish of the public is risk assessment and regulation. Some
indicate that at the present, the regulation of recombi-
nant DNA technology also effectively regulates the cur-
rent standing of synthetic biology [1]. As the science
progresses and becomes increasingly novel, increased
risk assessment will be vital to safety, funding, and prog-
ress. Furthermore, public engagement will be necessary
to determine which directions research should and
should not take. Increased investment devoted to the
study of risk assessment and public perception must take
place--especially because the technology is dynamic and
progressing--in order to reach the potential that synthetic
biology possesses.
4.) While bioterrorism is a valid concern, a major attack
using a synthetically derived bioweapon is not realistic at
this point in time [18]. The public is introduced to syn-
thetic biology in the media with bioterrorism often men-
tioned [16]. As Hart Researchers learned in a 2009 survey,
about 20% of the public in the U.S. has heard "a lot" or
"some" about synthetic biology [19]. Studies show that
once an assessment has been made about a risk, the ini-
tial assessment rarely changes, but rather becomes stron-
ger [20]. So, as the vast majority of the population is yet to
learn about synthetic biology, it is vital that efforts be
made to disseminate accurate knowledge to the public
through appropriate avenues. Opportunities to discuss
possible avenues for education could be discussed at con-
ferences dedicated to synthetic biology, especially the
iGEM conferences. Responsibility is taught at such meet-
ings and accepted within the community of synthetic
biology. As experts in the field, the teaching and applica-
tion of safe practices will lead to public trust.
Conclusion
As synthetic biology evolves, public perception will
greatly influence the destination of the science. A major
concern of the United States public is bioterrorism intro-
duced with increasingly efficient biological engineering
technology. To address this concern four possible steps
were suggested. These steps can be used as initial steps to
hear and integrate public concerns.
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